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Modern states have traditionally been reliant on nationalist and patriotic sentiments as a 
legitimizing narrative for war. Invoking national interest—first and foremost the preservation 
of political and territorial sovereignty and the protection of fellow nationals—has served as 
an effective means of mobilizing citizens to support wars and soldiers to fight in them. From 
a normative perspective, however, this position has been radically criticized. Political 
philosophers and international legal scholars now broadly agree that justified reasons for war 
must be focused on the protection of human rights: either as instances of self-defense, where 
the state may justifiably engage in war to protect its own citizens from external threats, or as 
armed humanitarian interventions (hereafter, AHIs) to protect vulnerable people from third 
parties, including their own government. In other words, the justified reasons to engage in 
war are cosmopolitan reasons—reasons that are general in their justification, universal in 
their scope, and individualistic with regards to their unit of moral concern—rather than ones 
limited to national self-interest.1— This normative account, however, presents what Cheyney 
Ryan has recently called the “cosmopolitan soldier dilemma,” and what I will hereafter refer 
to, somewhat less elegantly, as “the problem of cosmopolitan motivation in war.” Ryan 
describes the problem thus: 
 
In our post-patriotic age, we expect that universal values will provide the justifying reasons 
for soldiers’ actions. The question is whether they can also serve as motivating reasons, 
sufficient to inspire the self-sacrifice required. In the past, love of one’s country seemed to 
supply both; the question is whether respect for human rights can do the same.2 
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My aim in this article is to clarify this normative problem. In what follows, I make two 
central claims: first, I argue that this problem of cosmopolitan motivation in war can be 
usefully compared to the much more commonly discussed problem of cosmopolitan 
motivation in global distributive justice; second, I argue that the problem of cosmopolitan 
motivation should be evaluated not as a meta-ethical or ethical concern over the duties of 
individual soldiers, but as a political problem; specifically, as a problem regarding the 
legitimacy of the use of state power in creating and sustaining combat motivation.3  
In the first section of the article I draw the general analogy between the twin problems 
of cosmopolitan motivation in global distributive justice and in war, and explain my 
framework for analyzing different interpretations of these problems. In the following three 
sections, I analyze different versions of the critique —meta-ethical, ethical, and political—
ultimately defending the political interpretation. In brief, I argue that the salient issue is that, 
given considerations of legitimacy in the use of political power, a democratic army has to be 
able to motivate its soldiers to make the necessary sacrifices without relying on coercion 
alone; patriotic identification offers a way to achieve this in wars of national defense, but less 
so in AHIs. While my aim is to provide an account of the problem, I conclude in the final 
section by briefly considering two potential implications, each aiming to solve the problem: 
either that AHIs should be privatized, or that national armies should be transformed to 
become more cosmopolitan.  
MOTIVATIONAL CRITIQUES OF COSMOPOLITANISM: A FRAMEWORK 
 
Both proponents and critics of cosmopolitanism point to its “motivational gap”: the fact that 
people do not seem to be motivated to act as it prescribes. Assuming this motivational gap 
exists, there are obvious pragmatic and strategic reasons to address it if cosmopolitanism is 
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ever going to be implemented in practice. It is more controversial, however, to argue that this 
motivational gap should constrain normative duties and responsibilities. It is not difficult to 
see why; if we allow people’s lack of motivation to limit their normative obligations, this 
would let them off the moral hook too easily. In other words, we need a theory to explain 
how, if at all, cosmopolitanism’s motivational gap has normative significance.4 
Unfortunately, the answers to this question have so far been rather vague, as different lines of 
argument have been conflated with one another.  
In order to resolve this analytical ambiguity, I suggest the following framework for 
distinguishing among the different versions of the motivational critique of cosmopolitanism, 
each taking a unique approach to the relationship between motivational facts and normative 
theories:  
(i) Meta-ethical: the motivational capabilities of individuals are direct constraints on 
morality;  
(ii) Ethical:  the motivational critique is a version of the moral demandingness 
objection;  
(iii) Political: the focus should be on the preconditions of political legitimacy and 
stability.  
Approaching the meta-ethical, ethical, and political versions as separate arguments, with 
distinct premises and theoretical presuppositions, allows us to see which elements of each 
argument are useful for the construction of a plausible motivational critique, and which are 
either too implausible or plausible only in a weaker form.  
The first step in analyzing the problem of cosmopolitan motivation in war is to clarify 
what it is supposed to be. According to John A. Lynn’s influential framework, we should 
differentiate between three concepts of the soldier’s motivation in war.5 First, there is initial 
motivation: what drives the soldier to enlist in military service in the first place. Second, there 
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is sustaining motivation: this explains what keeps soldiers in military service. Finally, there is 
combat motivation: what explains the willingness to face the extreme costs and risks of war. 
In reality, the neat separation of these factors is somewhat blurred, but it is clearly possible 
for them to be separated to a degree. For example, it is quite plausible that a soldier’s 
motivation to enlist might not be the same reason she continues to fight under fire. For our 
purposes, it is crucial to ask which of these three factors, if any, poses a problem for 
cosmopolitans. 
My stipulation here is that the motivational critique of cosmopolitanism, in the 
context of war, refers primarily to combat motivation, the latter of these three concepts. The 
question of initial motivation becomes less dependent on ideology in the transformation from 
volunteer militias to professional armed forces, such as in most Western countries, such as 
the United States and France. While some individuals may join the armed forces for 
ideological reasons, recent sociological research has indicated that many pursue a military 
career for other reasons, including increased social status, pecuniary incentives, and the 
opportunity for professional mobility.6 The professionalization of the soldier on the one hand, 
and the normalization of military service in the universal conscription model in states such as 
Israel and Switzerland on the other hand, serve as plausible answers to the second question of 
what sustains the military as a stable organization. Insofar as these two questions pose a 
theoretical problem, it is mostly with an implicit reference to the third question: What drives 
the soldier to enlist and what keeps her in military service given that she is likely to face 
extreme risks and costs in combat?  
The salient motivational question, therefore, concerns the willingness to face the 
extreme risks and costs of war, including the risk of death and serious physical injury, as well 
as the psychological damage induced by these risks, such as from the difficulty of killing or 
survivor’s guilt. Herein lies the potential problem for cosmopolitans. The protection of 
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human rights requires states to engage not only in wars of national defense but also in AHIs 
for the protection of foreigners, even when these are not in the direct interest of the 
intervening state. This, I argue, is analogous to the motivational problem faced by social 
justice cosmopolitans: social justice, extended globally, requires those in affluent countries to 
sacrifice their wealth for the sake of distant others. The shared assumption at the heart of both 
problems is that patriotism is prima facie able to supply both the justification and the 
motivation to sacrifice for the sake of one’s fellow citizens in the case of domestic social 
justice and wars of national defense, whereas cosmopolitanism may provide the justification, 
but not the requisite motivation, to sacrifice for the sake of distant others. 
I do not wish to suggest here that AHIs are only guided by cosmopolitan or altruistic 
motives; indeed, it is often the case that they occur when the intervening state can promote its 
own interests.7 Nevertheless, my primary concern is with interventions in which the 
intervening state has little or no direct interest aside from supporting cosmopolitan ideals 
(think, for example, of the lack of intervention in Rwanda and Darfur). It is in these cases 
where the motivational gap is at its widest, and where motivating soldiers is most difficult. 
Paraphrasing Mary Kaldor, while the “old wars” soldier had to be prepared to die for his or 
her country, the cosmopolitan soldier of the “new wars” must be willing to risk his or her life 
for humanity. 8 This problem, however, is heretofore ill-defined in the literature; it could be 
plausibly understood as meta-ethical, ethical, or political. I consider each in turn.  
THE META-ETHICAL CRITIQUE: THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF A COSMOPOLITAN SOLDIER 
 
Meta-ethical versions of the motivational critique attempt to secure the normative force of the 
motivational gap by appealing to the limits of possibility or rationality. Alasdair MacIntyre 
famously argued that moral impartiality—the kind endorsed by enlightenment liberalism and, 
by association, liberal cosmopolitanism—is a flawed ideal; it is incompatible with what he 
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calls “the morality of patriotism,” whereby each member of the nation sees herself as part of 
a thick moral community to which she owes allegiance. The poverty of liberal impartiality 
becomes clear, MacIntyre argues, when the needs of the political community cannot be 
reconciled with individual self-interest. This is at its clearest in the case of war, as the 
morality of patriotism requires of soldiers “both that they be prepared to sacrifice their own 
lives for the sake of the community's security and that their willingness to do so be not 
contingent upon their own individual evaluation of the rightness or wrongness of their 
country’s cause.”9 A plausible reconstruction of MacIntyre’s argument here would be that 
such liberal (cosmopolitan) morality is flawed, since its impartiality and neutrality cannot 
provide individuals with the necessary combat motivation required for heroic sacrifice. 
This claim, however, seems exaggerated. Even if we accept MacIntyre’s contentious 
claim that morality must be embedded in practical tradition and social narratives, we would 
still need to accept two further claims for this motivational critique of cosmopolitanism to 
hold. First, we would have to accept that cosmopolitanism is unable to provide such 
narratives; and second, that only allegiance to a national community is able to provide the 
necessary combat motivation. Both of these claims are not only dubious, but also reflect the 
flaws of the meta-ethical critiques of cosmopolitanism more generally.  
First, it is a mistake to equate cosmopolitanism with a transcendental, impartial 
position, unable to provide ethical meaning. Indeed, even in the context of war there are more 
than a few examples of soldiers motivated by cosmopolitan ideals. In a study of combat 
motivation in the Iraq War, Leonard Wong et al. note that, for American soldiers, “liberating 
the people and bringing freedom to Iraq were common themes in describing their combat 
motivation.”10 While we may doubt the validity of these self-reports, or the justifiability of 
that particular war, this sentiment does not seem implausible. Indeed, cosmopolitan 
motivation is not necessarily in contradiction with the idea that the soldier’s self-perception is 
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a patriotic one. As recent research on Canada’s disproportional contribution to humanitarian 
missions shows, the willingness to sacrifice for distant others is part of the national identity of 
what it means to be “a good Canadian.”11 This is a point that MacIntyre himself concedes, 
albeit indirectly: accepting meta-ethical communitarianism does not preclude the possibility 
of moral attitudes toward nonmembers.12  
Second, the claim that only allegiance to the national community provides the 
necessary combat motivation is a minority view. Following the Second World War, 
psychological research has moved away from intrinsic theories of combat motivation to a 
focus on the importance of extrinsic sources, such as social cohesion, regimental military 
training, and different combat tactics for combat motivation and the avoidance of 
psychological breakdown.13 In other words, even if patriotism were a major source of combat 
motivation, it is very unlikely that it is the only or even the main source. In one sense, of 
course, these alternative sources of motivation may be as problematic for cosmopolitan 
arguments as they are for MacIntyre’s (more on this below), but this conundrum cannot be 
resolved without a further normative argument, to which I turn next.  
THE ETHICAL CRITIQUE: THE DEMANDINGNESS OF COSMOPOLITAN WAR 
 
In ethical versions of the motivational critique, the link between the motivational gap and 
normativity is achieved by claiming that cosmopolitanism is too demanding—in other words, 
it imposes excessive costs on the relevant moral agent.14 Critics of cosmopolitan theories of 
distributive justice argue that given the extreme levels of global poverty and inequality, 
adhering to cosmopolitan morality would be excessively demanding on people in affluent 
countries. Similarly, according to the ethical critique, AHIs impose excessive costs on the 
individual soldier. Therefore, the individual soldier cannot be morally required to fight in 
such a war, and such a sacrifice should be viewed as supererogatory—that is, morally good 
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but merely permissible, not obligatory. For some critics, this implies that AHIs, if they are 
fought at all, should only be fought by those who choose to fight them: either by heroic 
volunteers who take upon themselves the risks and sacrifices for moral reasons, or by private 
military contractors who explicitly accept these risks as part of the terms of their voluntary 
employment.15  
There are interesting analogies and disanalogies between this line of argument and the 
equivalent line of argument against cosmopolitan principles of distributive justice. In both 
cases, there exists a distinction between the domestic and the global case. While many 
individuals accept their duty to pay taxes to address domestic poverty, few would 
acknowledge an equivalent global moral duty. Global philanthropy is morally good, but not 
obligatory. The obvious disanalogy here, of course, is the type and moral significance of the 
required sacrifice: most accounts of moral demandingness draw the line at sacrificing one’s 
life, and often far earlier than that. So while the ethical argument from moral demandingness 
may seem suspicious in the distributive justice case—that is, it too often appears as a 
rationalization of unfair privilege—it certainly has some bite with respect to war. 
Nevertheless, despite its initial plausibility, I argue that the moral demandingness 
argument fails to support a motivational critique of cosmopolitan motivation in war. Before 
we unravel demandingness as it applies to the individual soldier, it is helpful to understand 
how it may be leveled at, and subsequently countered by, states. First, it construes duties to 
wage AHIs as either supererogatory or as imperfect duties of easy rescue open to the 
discretion of the state. Thus, apart from instances in which intervention will be virtually 
costless, states can reserve the right not to intervene. This, however, begs the question against 
cosmopolitans, as it is not clear why we should think of the duty to intervene as either 
supererogatory or as a duty of easy rescue, rather than a duty of justice. According to this 
latter interpretation, states are not merely permitted to engage in armed intervention for the 
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protection of strangers, they are (at least pro tanto) required to do so.16 Some theorists even 
argue that the supposed general distinction does not exist: a state is either morally obligated 
to intervene or morally forbidden from doing so.17  
Even if we reject this position and accept that the state’s duty to engage in AHIs can, 
in principle, be made optional by excessive costs, we still need to define what costs count as 
excessive. This is a perennial problem for all accounts of moral demandingness, and as yet 
there has been no convincing solution to it. For one, “excessive” costs cannot be defined 
solely with reference to the moral agent; whether a cost is excessive or not will depend on the 
context, on the cost to the patient in a case of a failure to act, etc. In cases of major atrocities, 
rejecting a duty to intervene on the basis of (relatively) minor costs seems perverse. 
Admittedly, if engaging in an AHI would cause the destruction of the intervening state, then 
it seems plausible to argue it would be too demanding. But quite clearly this would seldom be 
the case for regional or global powers. The cost to the state, in terms of both soldiers’ lives 
and material resources, will be often outweighed by the severity of the atrocities it ought to 
prevent. 
To return now to the individual, one may rightly object here that while the cost to the 
state may be minimal, for a soldier the risks of fighting in an AHI are too great a price. Given 
this disparity, John Lango argues that AHIs present a moral paradox: even if it is morally 
required of the state to wage an AHI, it cannot be morally required of individual soldiers to 
fight in such a war, given the serious physical and psychological risks they face.18 But even if 
we concede Lango’s paradox, it still remains unclear whether it supports the ethical 
critique.19 Recall that this argument is supposed to serve as a challenge to AHIs, but not to 
wars of national defense. Presumably, even though there is no reason to think that the costs 
for the individual soldier are any different in both kinds of war, proponents of the ethical 
critique would take them to be excessive in the first case but not in the second; in other 
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words, they relieve the soldier from the duty to fight in an AHI, but not from the duty to fight 
a war of national defense. But why is this the case?  
One possible explanation of this disparity is that the implicit contract between soldiers 
and the state involves consent to sacrifice for the national interest, but not for the sake of 
foreigners. As Martin Cook argues, imposing the costs of war without such implicit consent 
is a violation of a soldier’s moral autonomy, and what follows from this is that soldiers in 
national armies cannot be made to fight in AHIs.20 The appeal of this argument is clear, as it 
invokes the notion that sending soldiers to fight in “wars of choice” demonstrates a lack of 
respect for the state’s fiduciary duties toward its citizens. Yet the claim that the implicit 
contract between soldiers and the state justifies only wars of national defense is 
unconvincing, both normatively and empirically. First, as I argued above, classifying all 
AHIs as “wars of choice” is incompatible with the generally shared idea that states have a 
duty to protect the human rights of foreigners, which is accepted even in the formulation of 
Lango’s paradox.21 Second, even if this claim had some merit in the past, it is becoming 
quickly outdated as AHIs become more common. Even before enlisting, soldiers can 
arguably expect that their state may engage in an AHI at some time during their term of 
service.22 
A second possible line of argument suggests that unlike AHIs, wars of national 
defense are fought for the protection of a public good (national security or political 
sovereignty, for example). For this reason, they trigger a civic political obligation of citizens 
to share the burden of war. Refusing to fight in such a war will consist of free-riding on the 
sacrifices of others, and is therefore immoral; dying for the state can be required by the 
state.23 This objection rightly points out that the relevant question is not whether each 
individual has the duty to fight a war, but whether the burdens of the collective duty to fight a 
national war can be fairly distributed among members of the group. However, if we agree 
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that the state has even a minimal duty to engage in AHIs for the protection of foreigners, this 
is similarly a collective duty that triggers a civic political obligation. Unlike the burden 
involved in fulfilling distributive duties, admittedly, this burden cannot be equally 
distributed—even universal conscription is never truly universal. But this does not preclude 
other mechanisms for fairly allocating the burden, for example, through mandatory general 
conscription, or through a draft lottery,.24 Therefore the disanalogy between burden-sharing 
in wars of national defense and AHIs does not hold up: unless we assume that placing the 
burden of risk on soldiers in wars of national defense is also unfair, we cannot argue that 
there is a demandingness problem for AHIs. 
THE POLITICAL CRITIQUE: THE LEGITIMACY OF SUSTAINING COMBAT MOTIVATION 
 
Thus far I have shown that both the meta-ethical and the ethical versions of the motivational 
critique of cosmopolitanism in war are flawed in important ways. The meta-ethical critique’s 
strong conclusions are unwarranted: at least some people are capable of finding meaning and 
motivation in cosmopolitan morality; and, in any case, given empirical psychological 
research, we have little reason to assume that patriotism is the only explanation for combat 
motivation among individual soldiers. As for the ethical critique, the risks of an AHI cannot 
be plausibly conceived as excessive costs that relieve soldiers of their duty to fight in such a 
war—at least, not unless we are willing to make the same argument with regard to wars of 
national defense.  
The shortcomings of these two critiques should lead us to think that the problem 
posed by cosmopolitanism’s motivational gap should not be assessed with reference to 
individual morality. Assuming that this kind of critique could be made plausible at all, it 
needs to ask not whether a person’s lack of motivation constrains her moral obligation, but 
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whether people’s general lack of motivation affects the preconditions for the legitimate use of 
power by political institutions. 
An example of such an argument in the context of social justice is John Rawls’s A 
Theory of Justice.25 For Rawls, given certain psychological facts about human beings, and 
specifically the conditional nature of their willingness to cooperate under conditions of a 
generalized prisoner’s dilemma, adherence to certain otherwise attractive normative 
principles would be unstable. Even though each individual could potentially maximize her 
interests by regulating her behavior in accordance with the principles of justice, she is faced 
with the temptation to defect, or free-ride, so as to improve her position at the expense of 
others. Any moral principles that cannot provide a good solution to this problem, however 
otherwise attractive they may be, are thus unfit to serve as politically justified principles.26 
It may be argued here that Rawls’s understanding of the stability problem, and the 
possible solutions to it, is dependent on a questionable account of political legitimacy. Rawls 
is committed to the idea that all solutions to the stability problem must be ones that provide 
stability “for the right reasons,” or, in other words, show that a liberal, well-ordered society 
could provide its own internal motivation without relying on coercion. This is a highly 
questionable move, as some recent critics of Rawls argue.27 For the purposes of my 
argument, however, these concerns can be safely sidelined. Even more “realistic” accounts of 
legitimacy would need to differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate uses of political 
power, to sustain the distinction between domination and legitimate coercion; as such, they 
should be sensitive to facts about human motivation, and how normal human beings are 
likely to behave.  
Rawls’s objection to social justice cosmopolitanism as a political principle in The Law 
of Peoples, as well as other prominent political objections to cosmopolitanism, could be 
plausibly and coherently construed as arising from this motivational critique.28 For Rawls, as 
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for nationalist and republican theorists, what solves the stability problem within the state is 
the existence of a shared public culture as a basis of social trust. The lack of a global 
equivalent of this public culture is the central political problem of social justice 
cosmopolitanism. 
One obvious application of this view for the problem of cosmopolitan motivation in 
war is to translate it to the language of global distributive justice, with soldiers’ lives 
considered as a valuable natural resource. Citizens may be willing to spend this resource for 
the protection of their own state, but not for the sake of others. Conceptualized in this way, 
the problem then turns to the legitimacy of imposing costs on citizens for the sake of 
foreigners, asking whether it is they or the beneficiaries of AHIs who should bear the costs.29 
Unlike some critics, I am generally sympathetic of this act of translation. The political 
interpretation of the problem I wish to pursue here, however, is different: its focus is on the 
motivation of soldiers as citizens, specifically their combat motivation, not on the motivation 
of citizens in general. 
Moving from the question of civic motivation to the question of combat motivation, it 
is clear to see that the stability problem at the heart of Rawls’s analysis is one that plagues 
military institutions as much as civilian ones, if not more so. Even when soldiers are morally 
committed to the goal for which they fight, they find themselves faced with a collective 
action problem. Each soldier’s individual contribution to the war effort is likely to be 
minimal, and the costs of complying are unusually high. In these cases, the rational action for 
each soldier in battle is to flee, rather than to fight.30 
Returning to Ryan’s dilemma, introduced at the beginning of this article, we can now 
see that political legitimacy must do the heavy lifting to explain the problem of why a soldier 
will fight in a cosmopolitan war. In other words, the soldier’s motivation to fight will depend 
on the available solutions to the stability problem, and these solutions will differ in their 
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degree of effectiveness and legitimacy. For Ryan, the only acceptable solution to this 
problem is democratic public reason. The principle of civilian control on the military, 
specifically in democracies, means that “the military’s reasons must be those of society in 
general” and that these reasons should be Rawlsian “public reasons,” known by and 
convincing to citizens and soldiers alike, as “soldiers are citizens too.”31 Other means of 
creating and sustaining combat motivation, while technically possible, would fail to treat 
soldiers appropriately, and would therefore be illegitimate.32  
Ryan’s account effectively demands that, in order to meet the requirements of 
legitimacy, both (1) the justifying reasons for war will be public reasons in the sense that they 
can be each soldier’s reason to fight, and (2) the soldier’s combat motivation—her motivating 
reasons for action—would be generated primarily by appeals to morality and identity through 
reasoning and dialogue.33 This, however, is too strong of a constraint of the use of political 
power. Both claims are philosophically contentious, to say the least, and are far more 
demanding than most accounts of political legitimacy available in the literature, including 
Rawls’s own.  
Nevertheless, while Ryan’s account of political legitimacy may be too demanding, the 
framing of the problem of cosmopolitan motivation as one of political legitimacy is a helpful 
one. It will be useful, therefore. to consider different methods of creating and sustaining 
combat motivation — both those Ryan considers as alternatives to democratic public reason, 
and those he does not —and evaluate them in light of the limits of legitimacy on the use of 
effective political power. This, I argue, would help explain the problem of cosmopolitan 
motivation in war.  
Narcotics 
This long-standing tradition of war is the first alternative Ryan considers to democratic public 
reason.34 Different types of narcotics, from alcohol to methamphetamines, have historically 
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been used (and are still used) to induce aggression, overcome fear, and sedate the nerves in 
battle, and so would seem to be a potential solution to the collective action problem presented 
by combat; in other words, if the problem is that a rational soldier would not risk dying, the 
solution is to turn the soldier irrational.35 Ryan does not reject this option completely, as he 
considers the possibility that in some cases the use of narcotics would not violate the status of 
people as autonomous persons (for example, anesthetizing patients before surgery).36  
When considering the problem as one of political legitimacy, however, this analogy 
does not hold. Even if we accept that soldiers may permissibly use narcotics to allow 
themselves to overcome psychological stress, and that the coercive, paternalistic, and 
hierarchical nature of military institutions would permit the administration of such narcotics 
without explicit consent, the imposition of narcotic substances to undermine rational 
judgement is the clearest example of illegitimate domination, as it undermines the status of 
soldiers as moral agents.37  
Manipulation 
The second alternative Ryan considers is manipulation and the use of falsehoods, specifically, 
falsely presenting military interventions as instances of national defense.38 As examples, he 
provides former U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig’s statement that failing to hold the 
line against Nicaragua would lead to the “total destruction of our country and everyone in it,” 
as well as instances of Soviet leaders motivating soldiers to fight in Afghanistan by telling 
them that they would be fighting against Americans. The most blatant example in recent 
times is arguably the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. It is now widely held that the threat of 
weapons of mass destruction was, at best, based on flawed and distorted evidence, and at 
worse, an outright lie.  
This solution is again quite obviously problematic from the point of view of political 
legitimacy. Although a case could be made that absolute honesty is not a realistic or even 
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desirable demand of political leaders, such blatant untruths undermine the legitimacy of the 
state as a trustee of its citizens. More importantly, manipulation and the use of falsehoods 
cannot serve as independent solutions to the problem of combat motivation as I understand it. 
Indeed, both examples of manipulation provided by Ryan are parasitic on some other source 
of motivation (in the U.S. case, national self-defense; in the USSR case, ideological 
commitment) about which the soldiers held false beliefs.  
 
Positive and Negative Incentives 
The two alternatives discussed above concern altering the psychology and beliefs of soldiers, 
respectively. Yet these two solutions—tellingly, the only ones discussed in Ryan’s article—
are far from being the most common in the history of war and are also the most normatively 
suspect.  
A more common way to motivate soldiers to face the risks and costs of combat has 
been through extrinsic motivation, or the use of positive and negative incentives to resolve 
the collective action problem. For positive incentives, Geoffrey Brennan and Gordon Tullock 
give the example of the “spoils” system that was used by the British Navy, in which the loot 
of cargo from captured ships was divided between the fleet admiral, the captain, the officers, 
and the enlisted men.39 Other positive incentives may include more honorific rewards, such 
as medals, privileges, or rank. Conversely, armies have always used punitive means to secure 
soldiers’ motivation to fight, including demotion, imprisonment, flogging, and even 
executions. In the Second World War, the German Army executed at least 15,000 of its own 
troops, and the Red Army executed a similar number in Stalingrad alone.40 
The use of positive and negative incentives, at least in the general sense, does not 
constitute an illegitimate use of political power, and may indeed be justified in many cases. 
Returning to the analogous problem of motivation for social justice contributions, states 
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routinely use positive and negative incentives to encourage socially beneficial behavior and 
deter free-riding, fraud, and crime. Apart from hardcore libertarians, most political theorists 
agree that state coercion is at least sometimes justified and legitimate, so it may prima facie 
be legitimate to coerce citizens who are also soldiers.  
There are, however, two main problems in applying this line of thought to motivation 
in war. First, as the potential cost for each individual soldier is relatively heavy, the incentive 
should be proportionately large so as to be effective. Empirical research into combat 
motivation demonstrates that medals and other signs of honor “are hardly of much 
importance during the life-or-death decision making that characterizes combat.”41 The 
proportional negative response, that is, the threat of the death penalty, would not be 
considered legitimate in liberal democracies, whether relying on a professional or 
conscription model of recruitment. In any case, relying solely on coercive means to generate 
combat motivation would either push the problem to the recruitment stage, as this will affect 
the motivation to enlist, or generate new normative problems.  
A second problem is that any use of incentives, in order to be effective, would have to 
rely on the ability to monitor soldiers’ behavior in battle. In peacetime, such monitoring is 
achieved by state institutions, such as the police, tax agencies, and courts, and even then it is 
imperfect. In combat, however, as long as lack of compliance is exemplified not by blatant 
desertion, but by passivity and lack of engagement, monitoring would be difficult if not 
impossible to maintain.42 
 
Primary Unit Cohesion 
As mentioned above, a dominant view in military psychology is that unit cohesion is 
the central factor influencing combat motivation. In simple terms, the argument is that 
soldiers are motivated to fight not through ideology, professional commitment, or rational 
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calculation, but through bonds with “the primary group”—in effect, the small squad of 
individuals with which the soldier has personal, face-to-face relations. This concept has been 
widely influential in military theory and practice, so much so that it is considered by some to 
be a “dogma” of Western armed forces.43 From the point of view of political legitimacy, this 
approach seems preferable to the previous ones; its violation of soldiers’ autonomy is 
minimal, as the affective bonds are formed organically from the experience of training and 
fighting together. Relying on primary unit cohesion as the solution to the combat motivation 
problem, however, may be a double-edged sword. First, it is important to point out that it 
gives rise to wider ethical problems. For example, some argue that the exclusionary logic of 
social cohesion operates against equal service of women, minorities, and LGBTQ soldiers.44 
Others observe that unit cohesion generates strong associative duties that justify the killing of 
enemy noncombatants.45 These effects indicate that while unit cohesion may arise organically 
from the interaction between individual soldiers, it is not free from questions of political 
legitimacy. Second, it is important to point out that while this theory of combat motivation is 
widely shared, there are also questions regarding the validity of seminal studies, and general 
methodological skepticism over whether they actually reflect social cohesion or task 
cohesion, borne out of military training.46  
The main problem with primary unit cohesion, however, is that from the point of view 
of the military organization it may lead to counterproductive behavior. Soldiers may indeed 
form bonds with their comrades that facilitate cooperation, but these bonds can be expressed 
not only through enhanced combat motivation but also through desertion, mutiny, or even 
outright lethal assault on fellow soldiers (“fragging”). In other words, interpersonal bonds 
between soldiers may enhance their loyalty toward each other, but this loyalty could 
potentially clash with their commitments to the ends of the wider organization. Thus, while 
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primary unit cohesion is a powerful instrument for creating and sustaining combat 
motivation, it can also have the adverse effect.  
 
Moral and Ideological Motivation  
The idea here is simple: if some ideas are worth dying for, the risk of combat would not 
generate a collective action problem. However, two problems plague this strategy as an 
explanation of the problem of cosmopolitan motivation in war. First, the predominance of 
cohesion theories among military psychologists demonstrate that soldiers very rarely state 
ideological reasons as their explicit motivation. Second, interpreted as variations on 
individual moral motivation, it is difficult to see why patriotism is superior to 
cosmopolitanism. Even if we accept that soldiers are more likely to be motivated by 
patriotism as a matter of fact, it is unclear why they could not just as easily be motivated by 
cosmopolitanism. 
A possible answer to this puzzle is found in military sociologist Charles Moskos’s 
concept of “latent ideology.” In his study of the Vietnam War, Moskos argues that former 
studies discrediting the role of ideology in combat motivation were overly dismissive. While 
soldiers did not express explicit ideological motivations, their implicit commitment to the 
values and goals of their civic society were an important factor in their combat performance, 
and served as a countermeasure to the possible negative effects of small unit cohesion. 
Moskos posits that cohesion will “maintain the soldier in his combat role only when he has an 
underlying commitment to the worth of the larger social system for which he is fighting.”47 
Importantly, this ideology does not serve merely as a source of individual moral motivation. 
Through an interaction between self-concern, primary group cohesion, and latent ideology, 
Moskos claims that the latter becomes a solution to the combat experience, as “individual 
behaviour and small-group processes occurring in combat squads operate within a 
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widespread attitudinal context of underlying value commitments.” As Anthony King 
interprets this thesis, Moskos argues that “general commitments to national goals were drawn 
upon in the micro-interactions within primary groups and collectively used by soldiers to 
comprehend their sacrifices and to impose expectations on each other.”48 Latent patriotic 
ideology was not a substitute for the primary group cohesion, but rather defined, justified, 
and augmented the mutual obligations between soldiers. 
Following Moskos’s theory, and given that currently the main institutions used for 
waging war are national armies, it is possible to maintain that patriotic identification serves 
more than simply a source of moral motivation for the individual soldier. In fact, it could be 
seen as an effective way for states and national armies to resolve the problem of combat 
motivation in a way that combines the respective merits of the alternative strategies discussed 
above. First, while sustaining patriotic identification may involve appeals to emotions and 
rhetoric as well as possible fictions with regard to national history, this is quite clearly less 
problematic in terms of political legitimacy than the use of narcotics or manipulation of the 
truth. Second, while the appeal to patriotism involves employing incentives and sanctions, 
these are not institutionally directed incentives and sanctions, but those embedded in a social 
and political culture, internalized within the soldier herself. Third, patriotism augments the 
necessary social cohesion, but this is wider than the small primary unit in an important sense. 
The soldier is not merely motivated by patriotism, but the fact that other soldiers are 
compatriots serves to secure the necessary trust, which at least mitigates the assurance 
problem. Finally, at least in wars of national self-defense, the institutional goals of the 
national armed forces and the personal motivation of the soldier align, or at least are largely 
compatible with each other.  
A reasonable objection here is that relying on patriotism is a dangerous gamble. 
Patriotism often devolves into a false belief in the superiority of one’s nation, leading to the 
 21 
 
thought that protecting the national interest outweighs the wrongness of harm inflicted on the 
enemy. These psychological slippery slopes appear to put patriotic motivation in conflict with 
the mission of any justified AHI, and even wars of national defense would risk violating 
fundamental jus in bello principles. 
 Given the possible alternatives, however, it is not clearly the case that patriotism is 
the most dangerous motivation in terms of jus in bello violations. It is difficult to see why, for 
example, soldiers motivated to fight by fear of punishment or by a desire for reward would be 
any more willing to constrain their violence—assuming, recall, that these incentives were 
supposedly powerful enough to motivate a soldier to face the serious risks of combat. As for 
unit cohesion, it too has a dark side: loyalty to unit members and the importance of 
maintaining one’s social standing among peers can lead to turning a blind eye to, or actively 
taking part in, war atrocities.49 Even an individual soldier motivated by cosmopolitan ideals 
may be subject to violating in bello principles, since belief in the moral rightness of one’s 
cause could just as easily lead to the same psychological slippery slopes. 
Second, and more importantly, the objection against patriotism implicitly assumes 
that war atrocities could only be avoided by soldiers’ intrinsic restraint. This, however, is a 
curious thought; even if patriotism may be an effective way to generate combat motivation, 
this does not mean that other forms of incentives are not in play. Crucially, relying on 
patriotism as a source of motivation does not preclude disciplinary and legal sanctions against 
the violation of jus in bello constraints. Indeed, it may even be undesirable and imprudent to 
rely solely on soldiers’ intrinsic motivation in this case, given that their institutional role is to 
achieve military goals most efficiently. This is true for the same reasons it would be 
undesirable and imprudent to rely on corporate managers’ intrinsic motivation to obey the tax 
code (given that their institutional role is, charitably, to maximize profits for shareholders), or 
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on local politicians’ intrinsic motivation to avoid corruption (given that their institutional role 
is, charitably, to advance the interests of their constituency).  
If this interpretation of the role of patriotism in combat motivation is persuasive, then 
the problem of cosmopolitan motivation in war becomes clear. Patriotism, as a latent 
ideology in national armies, serves to secure trust and commitment to wider social goals and 
to mitigate the limitations of alternative mechanisms. As long as cosmopolitanism remains 
merely a source of moral motivation for the individual soldier not accompanied by a widely 
shared latent ideology, militaries engaged in AHIs would have to rely on alternative 
mechanisms to resolve the problem of combat motivation. As these alternative mechanisms 
are problematic with respect to political legitimacy, states that engage their national armies in 
AHIs seem, therefore, to face a dilemma: either considerably limit the risk to their soldiers to 
avoid encountering failures of combat motivation, or risk undermining the legitimacy of their 
use of political power. This political interpretation of the problem of cosmopolitan 
motivation, therefore, sheds light on the difference between wars of national defense and 
AHIs. 
TWO POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS: PRIVATIZATION AND COSMOPOLITAN TRANSFORMATION 
 
I will now briefly consider two potential implications of my interpretation of the problem. 
One implication is that soldiers’ motivation for fighting a war need not be connected to the 
reasons justifying a war, and the duty to engage in AHIs can be outsourced to private 
contractors. Another implication is that national armies should be transformed to become 
more cosmopolitan in character. While it is beyond the scope of this article to determine 
which of these solutions is preferable, it is important to understand what their pitfalls may be. 
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Privatizing AHIs 
Ryan’s dilemma arises, as we saw, from an apparent disconnect between the reasons 
justifying war and the reasons that motivate soldiers to face the risks of war. But one may 
well challenge the necessity of this connection. It may be that soldiers’ motives for fighting a 
war are different from those justifying the war, but this in itself is not problematic. One 
possible implication of this argument is that AHIs should be fought not by national armies, 
but by private military contractors (PMCs), motivated by monetary incentives. If this is a 
feasible and desirable solution, Ryan’s dilemma is dissolved, and with it the supposed 
problem of cosmopolitan motivation in war. 
One common argument against turning to PMCs is that the private contractor’s self-
interested motives to fight undermine the moral value of his actions. This argument is 
unconvincing for two reasons. First, it would be impossible to distinguish between 
mercenaries and non-mercenaries on that ground. As discussed above, many soldiers in 
national armies join the force for self-interested motives, and evidence shows that many 
mercenaries join PMCs for ideological, sometimes even patriotic reasons.50 Second, as Cécile 
Fabre argues, even if the motives of individual soldiers do matter morally, the moral 
goodness of protecting potential victims of atrocities outweighs the moral badness of acting 
with the wrong motives, in the same way that the moral goodness of keeping a patient alive 
outweighs the badness of her doctor performing surgery solely for greed, or because he 
enjoys cutting people up.51 
It is important to notice, however, that this objection does not address the problem of 
cosmopolitan motivation in war as I interpret it above. The problem of political legitimacy, 
after all, is not with the permissibility of soldiers’ motives and what they do, but with the 
legitimacy of what is done to them.  
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Though there are potential problems of legitimacy with the use of PMCs for AHIs – for 
example, with regards to democratic control, communal bonds, and military effectiveness52 - a 
potential benefit is that the contractual obligations between states and the employees of private 
contractors is different in nature and scope than those between the state and its citizens.53 This 
holds even when employees of PMCs are also citizens of the state, as was the case, for example, 
for Blackwater (subsequently renamed XE and Academi) employees in Iraq and Afghanistan 
who are also American nationals. In this case, the problem is dissolved, since the constraints 
on the legitimate use of political power simply do not apply to private contractors. In addition, 
as observed above, this outsourcing of AHIs also has the interesting implication of translating 
the problem of cosmopolitan motivation in war to that of cosmopolitan motivation in 
distributive justice: since the citizens of the intervening state are still required to foot the bill 
for the intervention, the question becomes analogous to those surrounding, for example, 
international development aid. While there is still a cost, it can more easily be distributed across 
the civilian population. 
However, if the analysis in the previous section is accurate, it still remains an open question 
whether PMCs are better placed than national armies to resolve the problem of combat 
motivation. First, PMCs face a similar predicament to national armies in creating and sustaining 
combat motivation, even if their employees are motivated primarily by financial remuneration, 
as the problem of combat motivation is distinct from that of initial motivation to join such a 
company. As argued above, however, relying on positive and negative incentives alone is likely 
to be a suboptimal solution, so PMCs will likewise have to draw on other sources of motivation. 
Second, the state does not relinquish its responsibility toward PMC employees, even if the 
responsibility is different in nature from that it has toward soldiers in national armies. If PMCs 
working for the state engage in methods that are harmful or manipulative to their employees, 
the state cannot simply wash its hands of this. The problem of cosmopolitan motivation in war 
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is simply pushed back: while the state may not be involved directly in these practices, it 
facilitates them and is therefore complicit in a way that affects the legitimacy of its use of 
power.  
 
Creating Cosmopolitan Armies 
Another possible implication of the preceding argument is that cosmopolitan wars call for 
cosmopolitan armies. It is not that these wars cannot be legitimately fought by national 
armies—and therefore must be outsourced to private contractors—but that there is a need to 
transcend the social and political circumstances responsible for the problem. Elke Krahmann, 
for example, argues that new security challenges require the transformation of the political 
community, and by implication the republican citizen-soldier, toward a transnational 
community of shared risk. Recognizing the shared interest of regional and global 
communities would lead to a shift in societal values toward transnational solidarity and a duty 
to protect others, whereas drafting cosmopolitan soldiers from the same society would retain 
the “congruence between the norms and beliefs of the armed forces and the strangers whom 
they serve.”54 Defending the feasibility of this proposal, Krahmann writes that in countries 
whose national armies are routinely involved in international peacekeeping and humanitarian 
missions, such as Sweden, Norway, Germany, and Austria, support for these missions is 
greater among their conscripted national armies than it is among professional militaries in the 
United Kingdom and the United States.55 
This is an attractive normative proposal that potentially splits the difference between 
the validity of cosmopolitan justifications for war and the effectiveness of patriotic 
identification as a solution to the motivation problem. There are still reasons for caution, 
however. First, as transnational solidarity is assumed to rely on common susceptibility to 
security risks, the link between prudent self-interest and the solidarity it is supposed to 
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motivate could prove rather contextual and unstable. While it is possible that these prudent 
actions will lead to the development of a shared transnational ethos, this causal mechanism 
remains rather vague. Second, as Krahmann herself concedes, these transnational political 
communities, although transcending national boundaries, would necessarily remain bounded, 
most likely as regional communities of risk (for example, Western European democracies 
through NATO).56 As such, it remains to be seen how the extended sense of political 
community would engender a motivation to engage in wars beyond the bounded scope of this 
community.  
The concerns about these two implications are not insurmountable, but good answers to them 
will require considerable empirical analysis. Nevertheless, the political interpretation of the 
problem highlights the specific predicaments of states engaging in AHIs, and this 
interpretation should therefore guide states in evaluating possible alternatives.  In doing so, 
we should avoid the tendency of either ignoring motivational facts, or considering them only 
instrumentally. Thinking about the problem of motivation in war as one of political 
legitimacy provides a more fruitful way forward, and should lead academics and political 
leaders to reconsider the role of national armies in AHIs.  
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